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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Appellants/Defendants are Grant S. Huish and Utah Funding and Loan, Inc.
(collectively referred to hereafter as "Huish"). Appellees/Plaintiffs are Tim P. Bennett,
Dale R. Bennett, and Bennett and Economy Sanitation, Inc. (collectively referred to
hereafter as "Bennetts").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the statute of frauds requires an escrow agreement to be in writing

and whether the alleged oral statements in this case constituted an escrow agreement that
had to be in writing to be enforceable. (R. 99-101; 153-156)
Standard of Review. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Dowling
v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004).
2.

Whether the trial court erred by considering parol evidence contrary to the

plain meaning of closing statement (Exhibit 102, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). (R.
100; Trial Transcript, pp. 3,45 "hereafter "Tr.").
Standard of Review. Whether to admit parol evidence is a question of law, that is
reviewed for correctness. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 750 (Utah 2002). Facts regarding

1

whether the parties adopted a writing as a complete integration of their agreement are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. Id.
3.

Whether the elements for breach of fiduciary duty were met. (R. 101; 161-

62).
Standard of Review.

Whether a party breached a fiduciary duty is a mixed

question of law and fact where the trial court is granted ample discretion. C & Y Corp, v.
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
4.

Whether Plaintiff established all the elements for conversion. (R. 103; 162).

Standard of Review. A trial court's conclusion of law in civil cases are reviewed
for correctness. Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004).
5.

Whether punitive damage were unwarranted, excessive, and a violation of
Appellant's constitutional due process rights. (R. 103; 158-160).

Standard of Review. Whether punitive damages are excessive is reviewed de
novo. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064, 1072 (Utah 2003).
6.

Whether Huish is personally liable for acts in the course and scope of his

employment. (R. 162).
Standard of Review. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. Bowling v.
Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. On or about October 1, 2003, Bennetts filed suit

against Huish alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of express trust, imposition of
constmctive trust, conversion, fraud, and punitive damages, alleging they were entitled to
2

a $27,955.98 plus attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The basis for the
complaint stems from alleged statements made by Huish that he would hold $27,955.98
from the $70,000 hard money commercial loan ("Waterpro loan") for the benefit of
Bennetts to either pay extension or interest fees on a previous $1,200,000 hard money
loan ("Beck Street loan") that had fallen into arrears, or to return the $27,955.98 to the
Bennetts by December 2000. (R. 1-6)
B.

A one day bench trial was held before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on

February 24, 2005.
C.

The trial court issued a memorandum decision on February 25, 2005

holding Bennetts were entitled to judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion in
the amount of $18,643.98 plus statutory interest from December 1, 2000 through the date
of judgment. The court also decided Bennetts were entitled to $50,000 in punitive
damages. Judgment was entered on or about March 15, 2005. A Motion for a New Trial
or to Alter or Amend Judgment was filed March 21, 2005 and after being fully briefed,
the court issued a Ruling and Order entered May 2, 2005 that denied the Motion for a
New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment. (R. 242)
D.

Notice of Appeal was filed on June 1, 2005.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1

1.

Plaintiffs operated a sanitation business with their father to pick up liquid

wastes such as septic tanks, garage sumps, kitchen waste sumps, etc. (R. 126; Tr. p. 16).

1

The trial court's Findings of Fact are found at R. 126-135 and attached hereto as Exhibit
"B").
3

2.

Tim and Dale Bennett took over the family sanitation business and in 1999

and 2000 began looking for property to house their businesses, including a dewatering
site to process the wastes. (Tr. p. 18).
3.

Bennetts located a commercial property at 1398 North Beck Street, Salt

Lake City, Utah 84116 ("Beck Street property") that would provide them desired space
for expansion of their business to become more profitable. (R. 126; Tr. p. 18).
4.

Dale Bennett contacted his son and daughter-in-law who were real estate

agents through Mansell realtors. They found out the asking price of the subject property
was $1.5 million dollars. (Tr. p. 19).
5.

Bennetts then negotiated and agreed upon a sales price of $ 1.2 million

dollars and then began trying to acquire a loan for the property. (Tr. pp. 19 and 20). At
the time, Plaintiffs had approximately $80,000 in the bank. (Tr. p. 20).
6.

Plaintiffs contacted Kary Austin, who is a loan broker, to try to find a loan

for them. (R. 127; Tr. p. 21).
7.

Because the Beck Street property was soon to be sold at a tax sale, Ms.

Austin contacted Grant Huish to assist in locating a short term "hard money" bridge loan
at less favorable interest rates. (R. 127; Tr. p. 21).
8.

Plaintiffs entered into a commercial loan agreement with Robert Kent of

UTCO Associates, Ltd., on or about May 1, 2000, for $1,200,000 which was brokered, by
Grant S. Huish of Utah Funding and Loan. The loan was secured by Trust Deeds on
several properties owned by Plaintiffs. (R. 108; Exhibit 107). Huish brought the

4

documents to the closing and he directed the disbursement of the loan proceeds. (R.
109).
9.

The 1.2 million dollar loan could be characterized as a "hard money" loan

because it bore higher interest rates and fees than a traditional loan from a bank or other
lending institution given the increased risk and circumstances of the loan. (Tr. 147).
10.

Mr. Huish was one of several loan brokers contacted by Kerry Austin of

Discovery Mortgage to try and fund a loan to Bennett & Economy Sanitation. Bennetts
paid some brokers in advance for their efforts to secure a loan (see Exhibit 112), although
no advance fees were paid to Huish. (Tr. 89).
11.

For services in finding a lender and brokering the loan, Huish received

commissions, origination fees, brokers fees, and loan points in the amount of $72,500.00,
representing approximately 6% points on the $1,200,000 loan. Discovery Mortgage
received 1% point or $12,000 for their role in the loan process. See Exhibit 10.
12.

Tim Bennett, Jr. and Amanda Bennett (the son and daughter-in-law of Tim

Bennett) acted as realtors on the $1.2 million purchase of property and received real
estate commissions of $78,000 through Mansell & Associates. (Tr. 68; Exhibit 114).
13.

On May 1, 2000, Bennetts entered into a loan agreement for $1.2 million

bearing interest at 18% per annum that accelerated to 36% on default. The loan also
carried a 10% penalty for late payments. The Promissory Note called for monthly
payment of $ 18,000. See Promissory Note Exhibit 106.
14.

The 1.2 million dollar Beck Street loan closed on May 1, 2000 in Inwest

Title. The closing was the first time Huish met the Bennetts. The terms of the loan were
5

90 days at 18% interest with default rate of 36% and late payment penalty of 10% of the
principle balance of the loan. (R. 127-28). Bennetts did not find the loan terms
acceptable but ultimately agreed, after consultation with their realtor, Dale Bennett, Jr.,
and because of representations by Huish, to close the loan. Huish represented he had a
long term loan that could be closed before the maturity date of the hard money loan,
although there was no guarantee of the replacement note and Bennetts signed an affidavit
of no take out indicating no replacement loan was committed by UTCO. (R. 128).
15.

Dale Bennett testified the Bennetts wanted the Beck Street property

because the price negotiated would provide Bennetts with $150,000 to $200,000 of
instant equity. (Tr. 63-64; 65).
16.

At the time Plaintiffs consummated the $ 1.2 million loan, the signed an

"Affidavit of No Takeout Commitment" that stated:
We (I), The Undersigned, BEING DULY SWORN, DEPOSE and
say that we (I) understand that there exists NO FUTHER
COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF UTCO Associates LTD, OR
ANY OF ITS LENDERS to provide a 'takeout' loan to pay off the
loan we (1) are receiving this day. The loan must be paid off from
OUR own efforts and not those of UTCO Associates LTD, or its
lenders. UTCO Associates LTD, may provide such assistance, but at
our request." See Exhibit 113.
Furthermore, Kary Austin testified the affidavit of no take out means there was no
replacement loan guaranteed. (Tr. 126).
17.

Tim Bennett testified Huish told him he guaranteed a replacement loan as

follows:
Q. What changed your mind?

6

A. Mr. Huish's guarantee that he had the loan secured for us, long-term and
it would definitely close within 30, no more than 45 days.
Q. Do you remember what Mr. Huish told you particularly?
A. That it would not take - it - there was not enough time before the tax
sale to do all the paperwork, it would take an additional 30 days,
absolutely no longer than 45 days to close the long-term loan. So I
would receive money back from the original payments. (Tr. 23).
18.

Those present at the closing table on the $1,200,000 commercial loan were

Tim Bennett, Tim Bennett, Jr., Amanda Bennett, Dale Bennett, Kary Austin, and Grant
Huish. (Tr. 72). Kary Austin (the loan broker from Discovery Mortgage who referred
the Bennetts to Huish) testified "He told them he had a replacement loan but there's no
guarantee." (Tr. 119). Austin also testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Do you recall whether Mr. Huish told the Bennetts at the closing that
he could not guarantee the loan that he said he had for them?
No.
He did not say that?
No.
He just told them he had a loan?
Right
You were aware that there's no guarantees on things like that
because of your experience?
Right. (Tr. 123).

Further, Huish testified "I could never make such a guarantee on that type of transaction."
Huish. (Tr. 154).
19.

Huish represented to the Bennetts that UTCO, the lender, required three

checks made out at closing in the amounts of $18,000 dated June 1, July 1, and August 1,
payable to UTCO. (R. 129).
20.

Although Plaintiffs made timely interest payments on the $1.2 million

dollar loan, they were not able to make the balloon payment on August 1, 2000 as called
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for by the Note. On or about August 2, 2000, Plaintiffs paid $ 18,000 for extension fee, of
which 1% point or $12,000 was paid to UTCO (see Ex. 103) and lA% point or $6,000
went to Utah Funding. See Ex. 2. Huish negotiated the extension fee by authority from
UTCO. (R. 129). The check was made out to Utah Funding at the request of Huish. (R.
129). The trial court found Huish owns and controls Utah Funding and Loan. (R. 130).
21.

The trial court's finding of fact 8 (R. 130) states "nothing was said at

closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such fees. The court finds that the
parties did not discuss that Huish would retain any commission as part of that extension
process when the extension was discussed." (R. 130). Kary Austin testified she did not
recall Huish informing the Bennetts he would be receiving additional fees for the rollover
or extensions to) UTCO. (Tr. 115-116). Although Finding of Fact 8 states "nothing was
said at closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such [extension or rollover]
fees" Tim Bennett admitted Huish told him UTCO would charge extension fees.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

He explained to you that there would be extension fees if the loan
was not paid off within the 90 day time period provided in the note,
correct?
He explained to me that UTCO would charge me extension fees.
UTCO.
Didn't he also explain to you that Utah Funding would also receive
extension fees?
No, he did not. It was UTCO and UTCO only was, to my
knowledge was the ones that received the fees. (Tr. 72).

22.

The trial court found Huish failed to fully disclose that he would take a

commission based on work in obtaining that extension. (R. 130). However, the Bennetts
proposed finding of fact 10 admitted "At the closing, Grant Huish described the terms of
the proposed $1,200,000 loan to the Plaintiffs. The following terms, among others, were
8

discussed: the loan must be repaid in full within 3 months; the interest rate would be
18%; monthly interest payments of $18,000 would need to be made; if the loan was not
repaid in a timely fashion, interest would increase to 36%; and there would be loan
extension fees to extend the due date of the loan beyond three months." (Bennetts
proposed Finding of Fact, ]f 10; R. 107) (emphasis added).
23.

Huish later advised Bennetts to further reduce the UTCO loan principal and

Bennetts mortgaged another property and obtained $93,308, and paid UTCO $74,308
with approximately $40,000 toward principal reduction, $19,000 for extension fees, and
$14,000 for interest. The trial court found Huish had a duty to disclose he was taking
$19,000 for the extension fees and $14,000 for interest. (R. 131).
24.

In October and November of 2000, the parties stipulated and the court

found Huish was involved in obtaining a long term loan with Bank of Utah in Ogden as
evidenced by the proffer of testimony from Carrie Fullerton (Tr. 145). At about the same
time, Plaintiffs contacted Grant Huish of Utah Funding about another "hard money" loan
in order to bring the $1.2 million dollar loan current. Mr. Huish secured another lender,
Waterpro, Inc., to loan $70,000.00 to Plaintiffs to bring the $1.2 million dollar loan
current. (Tr. 158-59).
25.

On or about November 3, 2000, a loan was consummated between

Plaintiffs and Waterpro, Inc., that was due January 3, 2001. The terms of the Waterpro
loan were 16% interest accelerating to 36% upon default, with 10% penalty for late
payments. See Exhibit 100. As a result of this loan, the $1.2 million dollar loan was
brought current and Plaintiffs' received net proceeds of $20,674.92 after paying loan
9

points, fees, prepaid interest, origination fees and brokerage fees to Utah Funding. See
Exhibit 102.
26.

As a result of the $70,000.00 Waterpro loan, Utah Funding and Loan

received loan points, document prep fees, origination fees, commissions and fees of
$5,350, or approximately 7.64% of the loan amount.
27.

Funds disbursed from the $70,000 Waterpro loan to bring the $1.2 million

dollar Beck Street loan current included the following:
Disbursements for Borrower
To: Utah Funding and Loan
For: 30 day Loan extension Beck
Street
To: Synergetics
For: Interest payment Beck Street
(Ex. 103)

$27,955.98

$13,977.99

The first disbursement to Utah Funding & Loan of $27,955.98 equals 3% of
$931,844, which was the remaining principal balance of the loan at that time.
28.

There was no evidence, written or otherwise, of any agreement that the

$27,955.98 paid to Utah Funding was to be held in escrow to make future loan extension
payment(s). The $27,955.98 amount that is the subject of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs
represents 3% points of the remaining balance of the $1.2 million loan (which was
$931,844 at that time (see Ex. 103)), of which 1% point or $9,314.00 went to UTCO
Associates, Ltd. (see Ex. 103) and the remaining 2% points or $18,628.00 went to Utah
Funding & Loan and Huish Company. The disbursement of $13,977.99 is interest of
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1.5% (18% annually) on the outstanding principal balance of $931,844. See Exs. 10 &
103.
29.

Kary Austin testified brokers of hard money loans operate differently than

brokers of traditional loans and the brokers on hard money loans have more involvement
with extension fees and so forth. (Tr. 125).
30.

Plaintiffs were disbursed $20,674.92 from the second loan after the 1.2 million

dollar loan was brought current. See Exhibit 102.
31.

Eventually, Bennetts once again were not able to make the balloon payment and

were informed in a letter dated December 7, 2004 from UTCO Associates, LTD, the loan was in
default. See Exhibit 108. When no long term loan was forthcoming, UTCO, through Huish,
advised Bennetts there would be a $50,000 rollover or extension fees, and the court found,
contrary to Huish's testimony, it was Huish' decision to set that amount. (R. 133).
32.

Plaintiffs signed its bankruptcy Statements & Schedules upon which the

following language was prominently printed: "Penalty for making a false statement or

2

As Huish states in his affidavit, he did not set the extension fee in the amount of
$50,000. Bob Kent of UTCO, who is now deceased, instructed Huish to demand $50,000
for an additional extension. (R. 174-76). There was not even any testimony alleging
Huish set $50,000 as the extension fee amount rather than Robert Kent of UTCO.
Neither Tim Bennett, Amanda Bennett, or Kary Austin said anything in Court calling into
question whether or not the $50,000 amount demanded for an extension fee came from
Bob Kent. The lender, UTCO, after agreeing to 4 months extensions on the large $1.2
million dollar loan, had the right to demand whatever it wanted for an extension fee or to
begin foreclosure. Forbearance to avoid foreclosure is not free.
Finally, this Court's finding that Huish was an "insider" with UTCO is incorrect.
As explained in Huish's affidavit (R. 180-83), Huish has no ownership in UTCO and in
fact UTCO has initiated foreclosure on Huish's house, and that foreclosure is still
pending.
11

concealing property; Fine of up to $500,000 or imprisonment for up to 5 years or both.
18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571." (Ex. 112).
ADDITIONAL FACTS MARSHALED IN SUPPORT
OF TRIAL COURT'S DECISION3
33.

Dale Bennett never completed high school nor did he obtain an equivalency

degree for high school. (Tr. p. 16). Tim Bennett, Sr., dropped out of school after the 8th
grade to go to work. Dale Bennett finished the 11th grade and then was drafted into the
Army. Plaintiffs are not sophisticated businessmen and had no previous dealings with
loan brokers other than through purchasing their homes. (R. 108).
34.

Dale Bennett owned six other properties in addition to his home and his

brother's home at the time they entered into the $1.2 million dollar Beck Street loan. An
estimate of the amount of equity in those properties as of April 2000 was right around
$500,000. (Tr. p. 20). Bennetts lost the equity in those properties.
35.

The loan Mr. Huish described at closing was not what Defendants expected

in that it was a ninety (90) day loan at 18% interest rather than a twelve (12) month loan
at 10% interest. (Tr. p. 22). Dale Bennett testified Mr. Huish guaranteed he had a longterm loan secured that would definitely close within 30-45 days thereafter. (Tr. p. 23).

3

Although it is Huish's contention the primary bases for reversal of the trial court's
decision are issues of law regarding whether an escrow agreement must be in writing and
whether parol evidence should have been considered, where alternative theories for
reversal address the trial court's findings of fact, Huish acknowledges his burden to
marshal the evidence that supports the challenged findings and then show the same
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,
1315 (Utah Q. App. 1991).
12

36.

Huish conceded he owed fiduciary duties to Bennetts in acting as their loan

broker. (Tr. 173). Huish testified he fulfilled his fiduciary duties by disclosing the total
amount of commissions, extension fees, but not an itemization or disclosure of the
breakdown of who received the fees because such itemized disclosures were not required
on commercial loans. (Tr. 173-74).
FACTS SHOWING FLAWS IN TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
37.

Prior to coming to Huish for the 1.2 million dollar loan, the Bennetts had

applied for and been turned down for a commercial loan from Brighton Bank, at least in
part, because the Bennetts did not have accurate bookkeeping records to process such a
loan:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Mr. Bennett, can you tell me why that Brighton Bank people - I
don't recall that you gave us a reason as to why they didn't get the
loan put together.
Because of the original books of the wrecking yard.
They weren't in order?
Yes.
Wouldn't that same issue be an impediment for anybody else to
getting a loan?
I was providing Mr. Huish an updated deal and he was aware, and
the Brighton Bank people were contacted if I remember right in
about September.
And did you ever get those financials in order after Brighton Bank
turned you down?
I was working with Mr. Huish on them. He had up to date good
financials to work with. They was referring to the financials before I
took possession.
But you didn't - you didn't have a complete set of financials to Mr.
Huish at any time, did you?
After I had taken possession, yes.
When was that?
From May. They was talking prior to my possession.
I thought you said - okay, maybe I've got this wrong, but I thought
you said that in August you went to Brighton Bank to get a loan?
13

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

38.

It was either August or September - I believe it was more like
September.
But they turned you down because you didn't have the proper
financial statements to Prior to my possession of the wrecking yard.
Did you ever get those financial records they wanted put together?
They was not available to be put together.
But my question to you if you didn't have the documents; to satisfy
Brighton Bank, and that was the reason they turned you down,
wouldn't it be important to get those documents together for
anybody else to try and get a replacement loan?
I put them together to the best of our ability. The documents I
provided to Brighton Bank before our possession of the wrecking
yard was too vague in their opinion. After we took possession of it,
it was fine. Prior to us taking possession, in other words, the
previous owner's records, not ours.
But you still - but it was still an impediment, a hurdle to getting a
loan?
Yes.
And that issue never was cleared up?
Well, with Brighton Bank the issue was basically that they didn't
have the money to make the commercial loan also. (Tr. 90-92).

The Bennett complaint asserted "Huish told Plaintiffs that he and/or Utah

Funding would hold $27,955.98 from the proceeds of the Loan (the "Money"), for the
benefit of Plaintiffs, either to pay interest or extension fees on another loan owed by
Plaintiffs, or to be returned to Plaintiffs by early December, 2000." (R. 2). Further,
Bennetts prayer for relief sought $27,955.98 plus interest, attorney fees and costs. (R. 6).
39.

At trial, however, Tim Bennett admitted that although their complaint

sought $27,955.98 based upon Huish's alleged oral promise to hold all $27,955.98 in
escrow to be returned to Bennetts at some unstated future time, at trial Dale Bennett
acknowledged at least $9,314 of the $27,955.98 was properly used to pay extension fees
to UTCO, the lender on the 1.2 million Beck Street loan. (R. 84-85).
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40.

Dale Bennett testified he talked to Huish on the telephone about the

$27,955.98 at issue in this case although he never sent Huish a letter and did not have his
lawyer send a demand letter for an accounting or refund of $27,955.98. (Tr. 107).
41.

Although Bennetts allege in their Complaint that the $27,955.98 was to be

returned to them by December of 2000, Mr. Huish never received any demand from
Bennetts for the $27,955.98 or any other amount of money from the time the loan was
taken out in November 2000 until the lawsuit was filed on or about October 6, 2003.
(Tr.168).
42.

Bennett & Economy Sanitation Incorporated filed for Ch. 11 bankruptcy

protection in December of 2000 (Tr. p. 87). On its Amended Schedule B—Personal
Property (R. 112), Bennetts listed a $6,000 security deposit made to George E. Hall in St.
George, Utah for 'loan brokering services." Tim Bennett testified he gave Mr. Bennett a
$6,000 non-refundable deposit to try and put together a $1,200,000 loan for the Beck
Street property. (Tr. p. 89). Because the Bennetts claimed they were entitled to this
deposit back, they properly listed it on Schedule B. (Tr. 89). However, there was no
listing of the $27,988.98 allegedly to be returned to the Bennetts from Huish on Schedule
B or Amended Schedule B. If the Bennetts believed they were entitled to a return of all
or part of this money, it would have been listed on the schedules.
43.

Huish testified he verbally disclosed his extension fees to the Bennetts

which is evidenced by the checks made out to Huish.
Q.

Let me have you turn to Exhibit 103. And there is a - can you tell
me where the first extension is reflected on Exhibit 103 on that
ledger sheet from UTCO?
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Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A,
Q
A

A
Q
A
Q
A

Q.
A.

August 2nd.
And what's the amount on that?
To UTCO was $12,000.
Now that's not - they actually paid $18,000, correct?
Correct.
And who did they pay that to?
They paid that to Utah Funding.
And why did they pay that to Utah Funding?
Because I negotiated and brokered that arrangement with the balloon
being due with UTCO.
And was that It's - Gerry, its as if I did a new loan for them. Their balloon was
due, their balance was due It's as if we negotiated a new loan for 30
more days. I would tell the Bennetts you have a 30 day extension.
Instead of closing this loan again, paying title insurance, doing new
deeds, we will accept a fee for $18,000 and extend that loan for 30
more days.
Is this the first hard-money loan that you've charged extension fees
for yourself?
No.
How often - how prevalenl is that?
All the time.
What are the percentages for extension fees?
That does vary. That's on what's negotiated between obviously Mr.
Kent as the lender and the client being the Bennetts. Mr. Kent
would say to me, okay, I need X amount of dollars to extend this
loan. I would handle the negotiation with the Bennetts and I would
be collecting a fee for handling of the extension of the loan.
Did you disclose all that to the Bennetts?
That's why the check was made out to me. (Tr. 156-57; see checks
as Ex. 8).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case is about whether $27,955.98 as identified as a disbursement for a
borrower on Exhibit 102 should have gone for loan commissions and points, or could be
held in escrow and returned to Plaintiffs at some point in the future. Further, there were
no terms of the escrow such as interest rate, deposit location, conditions upon return or
the like. Any escrow agreement alleged by Bennetts must be in writing to be
16

enforceable. If, as Plaintiffs contended in their Complaint up to the time of trial, that
$27,955.98 was to be returned to Defendants, it would have meant there was no penalty
or cost for forbearance on the $1,200,000 loan. Even unsophisticated borrowers should
realize that funds must be paid as consideration for forbearance to keep the lender from
foreclosing.
Further, Defendants contend there was not sufficient evidence to meet the
elements necessary to prove conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Also, it was
improper to hold Grant Huish personally responsible as he was at all time acting within
the course and scope of his employment with Utah Funding and Loan, Inc. Finally, the
imposition of punitive damages in this case was unwarranted and excessive.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATUE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES ESCROW AGREEMENTS TO
BE IN WRITING
This Court stated in Finding of Fact paragraph 14
A valid escrow account or trust was not created as there was not
writing to that effect. However, the Court does find that Plaintiffs
were told that if that amount was needed it would be held by Utah
Funding to pay for their extension fees or interest, or to pay
commissions to Huish for his work in obtaining the long-term
financing, then those funds would be used for that purpose. If the
funds were not used for those purposes, they would be returned to
Plaintiffs.

Moreover, in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law, this Court acknowledged "an
escrow agreement must be in writing."
This Court has held conveyances or encumbrances of land and related escrow
agreements are subject to the Statute of Frauds and must be in writing. In Fisher v.
17

Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this Court held in relation to a real
estate transaction "under the Utah Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was
required to be in writing. See Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1995)." That is the law in
Utah. Escrow is defined as follows:
A legal document (such as a deed), money, stock, or other property
delivered by the grantor, promisor, or obligor into the hands of a
third person, to be held by the latter until the happening of a
contingency or performance of a condition, and then by him
delivered to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. A system of
document transfer in which a deed, bond, stock, funds or other
property is delivered to a third person to hold until all conditions in a
contract are fulfilled; e.g. delivery of a deed to escrow agent under
installment land sale contract until full payment for a land is made.
Black's Law Dictionary p. 545 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
Bennetts alleged, and the trial court found, that Huish told Plaintiffs the
$27,955.98 would be "held by Utah Funding to pay further extension fees or interest, or
to pay commissions to Huish for his work in obtaining the long term financing, then those
funds would be used for that purpose. If the funds were not used for those purposes they
would be returned to plaintiffs." (R. 134; Finding of Fact, \ 14). Such an alleged oral
"agreement" described in this Court's Finding of Fact constitutes an "escrow agreement"
that must be memorialized in writing with all terms to be valid. Finding of Fact ]f 14
describes an agreement where funds $27,955.98 would be held by Huish/Utah Funding to
be used for certain alleged contingencies, and if those contingencies did not occur (i.e.,
further extension fees, interest, or commissions for long term loan) then the funds would
be returned to Plaintiffs. All the Bennetts causes of action fail without a written escrow
agreement. Otherwise, anyone who takes out a commercial loan could allege that just
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about any item on a closing statement was to be held in escrow and returned if certain
unstated conditions did or did not occur.
The circumstances of this case are very similar to the case of Miguel v. Belzeski,
70 F.3d 1274, 1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir 1995) (attached hereto as Exhibit "C") where the
Plaintiff sued the Defendant for breach of fiduciary duty alleging that the delivery of cash
as security for a bond was to be held in escrow with a deed to be returned if a bond was
not forfeited.

Id, at 3. The Miguel Court recognized the statute of frauds applies to

escrow agreements and not just conveyances of land. Id. at 6. That is also the law in
Utah. See Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176, supra. Moreover, the Miguel Court granted the
Defendants motions for summary judgment and dismissed all claims holding:
Plaintiffs can only prevail on their claim if they are able to prove the
existence of some writing evidencing the alleged escrow arrangement with
[the other party]. Even if Plaintiffs were able to prove the existence of an
oral agreement, that would not be enough under the Statute of Frauds.
There are reasons for the Statute of Frauds requirement. Without such a
rule governing conveyances of land, parties to such transactions could
attempt to unravel them many years later by alleging the existence of an
oral agreement contradicting the absolute language of the deed itself. The
trier of fact would have absolutely no way of ascertaining the substance of
the agreement.
Id. at 7. See also Hubbard v. Hubbard, 402 N.E.2d 857 (111. App. 1980) (Constructive
trust denied where grantor allegedly conveyed property per her brother's oral promise to
"make it right for her" because there was no valid written agreement to satisfy statute of
frauds.).
Indeed, the very purpose behind the Statute of Frauds is to prevent a fraud from
happening. In other words, it would be fraudulent for a person to file suit or make a
claim against a mortgage lender or broker years after a commercial loan was
consummated because the owner alleged amounts identified as "points, commission, or
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other fees" in a closing statement were to be held for some unwritten purpose and
returned upon the happening or nonhappening of those unwritten contingencies. To
allow a claimant to recover under such circumstances works a fraud upon Huish.
In this case, Bennetts simply had buyer's remorse and they are attempting to
unwind an agreement they knowingly entered into years ago. Because there is no writing
to evidence of any escrow agreement for $27,955.98, $18,643.98, or any other amount,
the claims for those funds fail as a matter of law whether the theory is conversion or
breach of fiduciary duty. All of Plaintiffs theories are tied to the alleged oral promise by
Huish to hold funds in escrow subject to certain contingencies and must fail if there is no
writing for the escrow agreement related to this real property transaction. Because the
funds went for extension fees as stated in the signed writing and not held in escrow
pursuant to any writing, there can be no breach of fiduciary duty or conversion.
Defendants are entitled to dismissal of all claims.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE
REGARDING WHETHER $27,955.98 WAS SUBJECT TO AN
ESCROW ARRANGEMENT
The trial court erroneously allowed Tim Bennett to testify about alleged oral

statements made by Huish about returning $27,955.98 to the Bennetts when the Closing
Statement plainly disclosed why that amount was disbursed:
Disbursements for Borrower
To: Utah Funding and Loan
$27,955.98
For: 30 day Loan extension Beck
Street (Ex. 102)
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Parol evidence to alter or contradict a writing is not admitted unless the writing is
ambiguous as a matter of law. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 802 (Utah 1994). There
is no ambiguity about what the $27,955.98 was to be disbursed for as the Closing
Statement clearly stated it was for an extension on the Beck Street property loan that had
fallen in arrears. It was improper to permit testimony that $27,955.98 was to be held in
escrow for extension fees or returned to Plaintiffs under any circumstance or condition.
Further, "to preserve the integrity of written contracts, we apply ca rebuttable
presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is
what it appears to be. m Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
The assertion by Plaintiffs that the Closing Statement was not an integrated
agreement, and therefore, did not bar parol evidence is misplaced under the facts of this
case.

The Closing Statement stood on its own and did not reference any other

documents. It was also signed by Dale Bennett and Tim Bennett. By its own terms the
"Closing Agreement" detailed the final distribution of all monies involved in the
transaction.

It was not a preliminary agreement, letter of intent, or partial closing

agreement. Every penny of loan funds was accounted for in the Closing Statement and
nothing within the four comers of the document suggested any uncertainty, ambiguity, or
contingency regarding any disbursement.
The fact that there is no integration clause in the Closing Agreement does not
mean there is an open door for testimony about alleged oral statements about the holding
of funds. See Henry v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 459 A.2d 772, 776 (Pa.
Super. 1983) (affirming summary judgment and barring evidence of alleged prior oral
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representations pursuant the parol evidence rule upon finding that, even in the absence of
integration clause, written loan agreement was complete as to subject matter).
Furthermore, escrow agreements are commonly part of real property transactions
and such escrow terms would be stated or referenced in a Closing Agreement. Because
the escrow arrangement would normally be included or referenced in the Closing
Agreement parol evidence should not be considered regarding an alleged escrow
agreement that is nowhere mentioned in the closing document. See Gemini Equipment
Co. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 595 A.2d 1211, 1215 (Pa. 1991) ("Parol evidence is not
admissible to show an agreement which normally is found in the written instrument.").
In Gemini the dispute involved an automobile lease that did not include a buy-out clause.
The lessee wanted to introduce evidence of an oral buy-out agreement made
contemporaneous with the time the lease was executed. The Gemini Court staled "[The
lessee] contends that the parol evidence rule does not apply in this situation merely by the
fact that the written lease agreement does not discuss the terms of a buyout.

It is

precisely this absence, however, which leads us to believe that such an agreement was
never reached." Id. Likewise, in the case at bar, an escrow agreement or agreement to
retain and possibly return funds is the type of matter that would normally be stated in an
escrow agreement and included or at least referenced in a Closing Agreement is such an
agreement really existed.

The fact that there was no mention of such an escrow

agreement, when it would normally be included, is the best indication that there was no
such agreement. Accordingly, there should have been no testimony allowed about any
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alleged escrow agreement and the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion
must fail as a matter of law.
Finally, the course of dealing of the parties is a good indicator of their intentions
regarding whether an agreement is integrated or not. See EIE v. St, Benedicts Hospital,
638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981) (holding, in analyzing whether the parol evidence rule
applies "the course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their intentions").
In the case at bar, the earlier extension fees were made by paying checks to Utah Funding
and Loan. (Ex. 8). Huish testified he disclosed his commissions for extension fees
verbally to the Bennetts, and indeed, that is why some of the checks were made out to
Utah Funding & Loan. (Tr. 157). Further, Bennetts admitted in the proposed findings of
fact that Huish told them they would have to pay extension fees if the Beck Street loan
fell in arrears. (R. 107). The documentary evidence therefore does not support the
Bennetts version of an escrow arrangement, and those alleged facts, absent a writing,
cannot support the trial court's decision.
III.

PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

In order to establish a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, Bennetts must
prove the following:
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a party must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) That the parties were
engaged in a joint venture; (2) That one party took actions which
benefited himself at the expense of the joint venture and which were
inconsistent with the understanding of the parties or otherwise acted
in a way inconsistent with the duties of loyalty, good faith, fairness
and honesty owed by parties engaged in a joint venture to one
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another; and (3) That as a result, the other party suffered damages."
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Bennetts failed to prove or establish Huish took action to their benefit that was
inconsistent with any joint venture or inconsistent with loyalty, good faith, fairness and
honesty owed to parties in a joint venture. Again, Huish was entitled to extension fees
for negotiating loan extensions and forbearance with the lender. Why else would Huish
be involved in the extension process if not to earn fees for his services?
There was no evidence Huish violated any statute, rule or regulation regarding
disclosure of escrow fees on a commercial loan. The trial court concluded in paragraph 6
of its Conclusions of Law, the extension fees may have been legitimate if they had been
disclosed.4 (R. 137-38). However, there is no legal requirement for a breakdown of
extension fees to be paid on a commercial loan. Federal regulation Z does not apply to
commercial loans. (R. 173).
In the $1.2 million Beck Street loan, the fees of $84,000 were disclosed on the
closing statement without any breakdown indicating that Discovery Mortgage would
receive one percentage point or $12,000. (Exhibit 105). How is that disclosure of the
aggregate fee permissible but the similar aggregate disclosure of extension fee on the
$70,000 Waterpro Loan improper? Bennetts acknowledge in their Proposed Findings of

4

This same paragraph of the Conclusions of Law also states "on three occasions Huish
kept a commission and failed to advise Plaintiffs he was doing so." (R. 137). However,
the Plaintiffs only claim was for the commissions that were part of the single
disbursement of $27,955.98 from the $70,000 Waterpro loan, and the Complaint made no
allegation of wrongdoing for previous commissions, disbursements or disclosures, and
the statute of limitations had run on those disbursements (R. 159) and accordingly, the
trial court's conclusions of law were not founded on appropriate legal basis.
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Fact and Conclusions of Law and in their testimony at trial, that extension fees were
disclosed by Huish at the time the $1.2 million Beck Street loan was consummated (Tr.
72; R. 107) and they were also discussed as the due dates approached. (Tr. 82). Tim
Bennett testified that although this made them somewhat nervous, they decided to go
through with the loan, including payment of a $78,000 commission to Tim Bennett's son
and daughter-in-law, and a 1% ($12,000) commission to Kary Austin at Discovery
Mortgage.
The $27,955 at issue in this case was fully disclosed to Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs
signed the closing statement acknowledging the extension fee was for a 30-day loan
extension on the Beck Street property. "It is well established that one party to a contract
does not have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and accurate understanding
of all terms embodied in a written contract. Each party has the burden to understand the
terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not thereafter assert his
ignorance as a defense." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc. 905 P.2d 901, 906 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995).
Furthermore, Huish demonstrated their good faith and loyalty in the $70,000
Waterpro loan in that Huish passed along the 16% interest rate, when the $1.2 million
Beck Street loan bore an interest rate of 18%. Huish could have charged Bennetts 18%
interest on the $70,000 Water Pro loan and Bennetts would have never known they could
have gotten the loan for 16%. Rather than take advantage of the Bennetts, Huish passed
along the benefit of the lower interest rate to the Bennetts.
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IV.

PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF
CONVERSION
Huish also did not wrongfully convert any funds. "'A conversion is an act of

willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person
entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession . . . . Specifically, a party alleging
conversion must show that he or she is entitled to immediate possession of the property at
the time of the alleged conversion"' Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp, 78 P.3d 988, 992
(Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (alterations in original); see also Lake Philgas
Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding
"To sustain an action for conversion, a party must prove that the act in question
constituted can act of willful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and possession.'").
The funds at issue in the amount of $27,955.98 were identified and disclosed as
extension fees for Beck Street property and not to be held in escrow subject to unwritten
contingencies. Accordingly, there has been no showing of wrongful conversion of funds
by Huish. The funds at issue went to satisfy extension fees and commissions in order to
obtain forbearance of the $1,200,000 hard money loan that had fallen in arrears. This
was plainly and clearly disclosed on the Closing Statement (Ex. 102) attached hereto as
Ex. A. There was no evidence beyond the alleged oral testimony that $27,955.98 or any
part thereof was wrongfully withheld any time. Because there was no writing for the
alleged escrow arrangement of the $27,955.98, there could be no breach or v/rongful
possession of the funds.
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V.

THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE UNWARRANTED,
EXCESSIVE, AND VIOLATE DEFENDANTS5 CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS AND OTHER RIGHTS.
Without any evidence of Huish's ability to pay or assets, this Court entered an

order awarding punitive damages of $50,000. This amount was purportedly based upon
extension fees obtained by Huish that were allegedly wrongful, although curiously, the
$1.2 million Beck Street loan and its associated fees were considered legitimate. Even
assuming that this disgorgement of extension fees is the appropriate basis for a punitive
damage award, the Court's Order of $50,000 is not an accurate reflection of the fees
obtained by Huish. Extension fees obtained by Huish were $6,000 on the first extension,
$19,000 on the second extension, and $18,628.00 on the third extension for a total of
approximately $43,628.00.
The seven factors to consider in awarding punitive damages are: "(i) the relative
wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and
circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the
plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the
relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded." See
Campbell v. State Farm, 98 P.3d 409, 414 (Utah 2004). Further, "reprehensibility is
c

[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.5" Id.

One of the reasons given for the punitive damages that were more than twice the actual
damages was that "No documents explained that an extension fee was being charged."
(R. 137). However, that is not accurate as Ex. 102 identified $27,955.98 was disbursed
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"To: Utah Funding and Loan For: 30 day Loan extension Beck Street." (Ex. 102;
attached hereto as Ex. "A").
While the trial court stated it found Huish's conduct "most outrageous" (R. 139)
there was no analysis or allegation that the conduct, even if true, was reprehensible.
Moreover, while there arguably was analysis of the alleged misconduct, facts and
circumstances, effect on Plaintiffs, and the relationship of the parties, there was no
evidence of the relative wealth of Huish, the probability of future recurrence, or a
justifiable and proportional relationship to the actual damages. Accordingly, the punitive
damages award is not sufficiently supported and cannot stand—even if compensatory
damages were upheld in this case.
This Court determined that Huish are not guilty of fraud. It was interesting to note
that in Guaranty National case, 769 P.2d 269, 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court
of Appeals held punitive damages are not intended as additional compensation to a
Plaintiff and further, concluded fraud alone may not meet the threshold necessary to
warrant punitive damages. Given that there is no basis to support a fraud claim against
Huish in this case, it is difficult to understand how Huish 4s non-fraudulent conduct can
warrant such a severe imposition of punitive damages.
At a minimum, this case should be remanded to take evidence as to the Huish's
financial situation or ability to pay punitive damages. In Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 P.2d
1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that a punitive damage award of $25,000
could not be sustained "because it was entered without adducing any evidence or making
any findings of fact regarding Defendants' net worth or income." Id at 1219; see also
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Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) (holding "in the absence of
such evidence [as to Defendants' networth] the award of [punitive damages] can not be
sustained."). Under these circumstances the punitive damage award is unwarranted and
excessive.
The $50,000 punitive damage award against Huish in this case violates the due
process clause of the 14 Amendment, because the punitive damages were excessive. It
is a fundamental principle of fairness and due process that a Defendant have the
opportunity to address and be heard on all issues before a judgment is entered against it.
This has not yet taken place in this case in that no evidence in ability to pay or financial
standing has been heard, alleged, or even argued before this Court. This Court even went
so far as to state in its award of $50,000 in punitive damages "the amount is probably
very generous to Huish and could easily be more." That conclusion is speculation devoid
of any evidentiary foundation whatsoever as there was no testimony or evidence on that
issue. If allowed to stand, that conclusion violates Huish's constitutional rights to due
process and their rights against excessive fines. See Campbell v. State Farm, 98 P. 3d
409, 414 (Utah 2004).
VI.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

A prevailing party is not automatically entitled to prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is only allowed where damages could be calculated with
mathematical certainty beforehand. Klinger v. Rightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (holding prejudgment interest is not allowed "where damages are incomplete
or cannot be calculated with mathematical certainty"). In this case, up until trial,
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Bennetts contended they were entitled to $27,955.98 and nothing less. Not until trial did
the actual compensatory damage amount get recalculated and determined by this Court.
Under those circumstances no prejudgment interest is appropriate. See James Constrs.,
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing "when
damages are uncertain or speculative until fixed by the factfinder, Utah courts have
refused to award prejudgment interest").
VII,

HUISH IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS IN THE COURSE
AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

At all times relevant to the allegations, Huish acted in the course and scope of his
employment with Utah Funding & Loan, Inc. Huish is entitled to the corporate shield
defense and cannot be held personally liable. See Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 667
(Utah Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting Plaintiffs argument "that the corporate shield defense
does not apply to an intentional tort, including conversion . . . [holding] there is clear
Utah authority to the contrary: "'An employer is liable for the torts of its employees that
are committed within the scope of employment, even if the tortuous acts were
intentional.'"). Even if a judgment is warranted, it should only be against Utah Funding
& Loan, Inc. and not against Huish personally.
CONCLUSION
There is no basis to hold Huish liable for the judgment imposed by the trial court
as the alleged escrow agreement described by Bennetts and the trial court was nowhere in
writing, and as such, could not be enforced. Furthermore, the logic of Bennetts'
argument for this money fails, as their testimony at trial is inconsistent with their
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complaint in theory. Finally, because the court erroneously enforced an oral escrow
agreement, there is no basis to sustain causes of action for conversion and breach of
fiduciary duty and the associated punitive damages. Accordingly, Huish respectfully
request an order from this Court reversing the decision of the trial court in its entirety.
<4£

DATED this J ^ ^ d a y of November, 2005.

WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.

GERRY B. HOLMAN
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by
on the 2i^ day of November, 2005to the following:
Chris L. Schmutz
SCHMUTZ & MOHLMAN, LLC
533 West 2600 South #200
Bountiful, Utah 84010

(iSfXJ.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Via Facsimile
( ) Via Hand-Delivered
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Tab A

1/3/2000
>ale VL Bennett
,oan Amount

$70,000.00

Hosing Costs:
Loon Points
Discount Fees
Appraisal/Inspection Fees
Title Insurance
Application Fee
Filing and Recording Fees
Document Preparation Fees
Escrow Fees
Attorney Fees
Origination Fee

Prepaid interest of 28 days
Total Closing Costs

$S,6O0.OO<^23
so.oo,

^ ^

~? a o ~

?0O

$470.00 — X > i w f i f
$0.00
$0.00
CT$250.dS) «*+* ^
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
^

disbursements for Borrower
To: Utah Funding and Loan
For: 30 dayLoan extension BeckSirSer

I

* — ^

$871

• Y

$7391.11
$27,955.98

To: Synergetics
For: Interest Payment Beck Street

$13,977.99

To:
For:

$0.00

To:
For:

$0.00

To:
For:

$0.00

To:

$0.00

FOT:

Total Disbursements:

$41,933.97

Check to Borrower:

$20,674.92
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIM P . BENNETT, DALE R.
BENNETT, and BENNETT and
ECONOMY SANITATION, INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 030921876

Plaintiffs,

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
vs.

GRANT S. HUISH and UTAH FUNDING
and LOAN, INC.,

DATE: February 25, 2005

Defendants.

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
February 24, 2005. Plaintiffs was present with and through Chris
L. Schmutz and Defendants were present with and through Gerry B.
Holman.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint on October 2, 2003. It alleged
five causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, (2)
violation of express trust, (3) imposition of constructive trust,
(4) conversion, and (5) fraud.

The complaint in summary alleged

defendants acted as an agent or broker for plaintiffs in
obtaining a $70,000 loan.

Plaintiffs allege that at closing in

November, 2000, defendants stated about $28,000 from the loan
proceeds would be held for plaintiffs, either to pay interest or
extension fees on another loan owed by plaintiffs, or that amount
would be returned to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege that the

money was not returned and was not used for the promised

purposes.

The complaint also

seeks

punitive damages on

causes

one, two, four and five.
Defendants filed an answer on October 30, 2003, denying the
essential allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses.
Very little happened with the case and the court put the
case on its order to show cause calendar for dismissal for
October 20, 2004.

Plaintiffs then filed a certificate of

readiness and the matter was scheduled for trial.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.

The court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiffs (the Bennetts) are brothers who ran a
sanitation business. They are not well educated nor sophisticated
in business matters. Tim Bennett dropped out of high school.
Nevertheless, they have been able to work hard and establish a
profitable business over many years. In approximately late 1999
and early 2000 they desired to expand their business by adding
another aspect to the sanitation business and beginning a salvage
operation as well.
to purchase.

They found a lot on Beck Street they desired

They used the services of one of their sons, a

realtor, to negotiate a $1.2 million price from the offered
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selling price $1.5 million.

Plaintiffs believed if they could

obtain that property they would immediately have equity in that
property. They contacted a mortgage broker, Kary Austin, to
assist in the effort to find funding for the purchase.
2. Austin began to work on finding funding and in April
2000, she and plaintiffs learned the lot was soon to be sold at a
tax sale, so Austin began to look for what is called a "hard
money" loan, at less favorable rates to plaintiffs, until a
conventional permanent loan could be obtained.

She contacted

defendant Huish, with whom she had worked before, to obtain a
lender for such a loan. Huish has been involved in brokering
mortgages for fifteen years and has done many "hard money" loans.
Austin and plaintiffs had desired a short term loan of
approximately one year.

The normal rate at that time was about

18%.
3.

Defendant indicated to Austin he could find such a

lender and then advised, on a short term notice, that he had a
lender and the plaintiffs and Austin should meet at Inwest Title
on May 2, 2000, to close the loan.

In fact Huish had contacted a

lender, Robert Kent, who did business as UTCO, with whom Huish
had often done business of such a nature.

The parties met for

the first time there and Huish for the first time informed
plaintiffs and Austin that the loan, with UTCO as the lender, was
for 90 days at 18% with a default rate of 36% and a 10% of the

3

balance as a penalty for late payment. Up to that point neither
plaintiffs nor Austin knew who the lender would be. The monthly
payment under the note was $18,000. The loan was to be repaid by
August 1, 2000, within three months. There were roll-over, or
extension, fees, that were discussed but those are not described
in the note.
4. Because the tax sale was soon upcoming, plaintiffs had to
decide whether to take that short term, or "bridge" loan or let
the opportunity to purchase the property pass.

Plaintiffs did

not find the terms acceptable but determined, with consultation
from their son and Austin, to undertake the loan based in major
part on representations of Huish.

Defendant indicated he had a

long term loan that could be closed before the maturity date of
August 1, 2000. No details were discussed about that purported
loan and there was no "guarantee" of that loan, but Huish told
plaintiffs he had a long term, replacement loan that would be
'accomplished before August 1, and in fact, within the next 30-45
days.

At the closing plaintiffs also signed an affidavit of "no

takeout commitment."

That document stated that UTCO, the lender,

made no commitment it would do anything to assist in the payoff
of this short term loan.
5. Based in major part on the representation of Huish
plaintiffs signed the note and trust deeds.

Three deeds of trust

secured by the property on Beck Street, the property at 164 Helm
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Ave, and a the property at 3648 South 200 East, properties owned
by plaintiffs, were signed by plaintiffs,
6. At the time of closing Huish advised that plaintiffs
should not contact UTCO but only Huish.
7. Huish stated that UTCO, the lender, required three checks
in advance and shortly after closing plaintiffs wrote three
separate checks, each in the amount of $18,000, dated June 1,
July 1, and August 1, 2000, payable to UTCO.

Huish told

plaintiffs UTCO demanded that as the three interest payments in
advance. From the loan proceeds, Huish obtained $72,500 and
Austin $12,000 as commissions.
8. Near August 1, 2000, though the parties had been talking
and discussing the long term financing during June and July, no
replacement or long term loan had been achieved. Plaintiffs were
not able to make the balloon payment by August 1, 2000, and no
one contemplated they would be able to make that payment without
a long term replacement loan. Huish advised that an extension fee
of $18,000 was required. That amount was set by Huish who had
authority from UTCO to negotiate an amount to extend or roll over
the loan.

Huish testified that fee was set in consultation with

UTCO but the court finds Huish set that fee based on a "standing"
arrangement he had with UTCO. Plaintiffs gave a check to Huish,
made out to Utah Funding at the request of Huish, in the sum of
$18,000. The court finds Huish owns and controls Utah Funding and
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Loan.

Of that amount, Huish paid UTCO $12,000 and retained the

remainder as his fee for negotiating the extension.

Nothing in

the note or trust deeds indicated Huish or Utah Funding would
receive extension or roll over fees and nothing was said at
closing of the loan about defendants receiving any such fees. The
court finds that the parties did not discuss that Huish would
retain any commission as part of that extension process when the
extension was discussed.

The court finds plaintiffs believed

Huish was involved, and the court finds he was, in obtaining a
long term loan and that Huish would be paid a commission for his
efforts on that long term loan. The court finds Huish failed to
fully disclose that he would take a commission based on work in
obtaining that extension. That payment of the fee extended the
due date on the balloon payment to September 1, 2000.

The court

bases that finding in part on the course of events that
transpired with respect to other payments plaintiffs made as
described below.

The court finds plaintiffs more credible on

this point based on several factors. Again, as described below,
other payments were being made by plaintiffs toward principle and
Huish testified he was not doing anything to further the long
term loan, as that was not why he was hired. Huish did indicate
he was involved in the long term loan in November, but the court
finds he had represented he was involved long before that.
facts belie his assertion there was no involvement earlier.
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The

Further, Huish testified he did not say to plaintiffs that he had
a long term loan available and the court finds the weight of the
evidence is contrary to that assertion.
9. The parties had been talking in June and July about
increasing the ability to obtain a long term loan and Huish
suggested plaintiffs mortgage their other properties, including
their homes, to reduce the principle amount of the loan with UTCO
to make it a more attractive loan to a long term lender.
Plaintiffs each mortgaged a property and provided Huish with two
checks, approximately $113,000 and $114,000, which were applied
to the UTCO loan principle in early August, 2000. The court finds
plaintiffs would not have done that without the involvement of
Huish, which involvement Huish denied.
10. In ongoing discussions Huish told plaintiffs to further
reduce the UTCO loan principal and plaintiffs mortgaged anotner
property and obtained $93,308, from a loan and at the direction
of Huish plaintiffs wrote a check in that amount to Utah Funding.
Huish then paid UTCO $74,308 of that amount in September, 2000,
with approximately $40,000 going toward a reduction of principal,
$19,000 for the extension fee, and $14,000 for interest. The
court finds that Huish had a duty to fully disclose that he was
taking approximately $19,000 as a commission for extending the
balloon payment date.

While Huish understood what he was doing,

and while it may be his normal practice, he did not tell
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plaintiffs in a way that satisfied his fiduciary duty, which the
court finds he had.

Huish was involved in ongoing attempts to

secure long term financing, or at least plaintiffs so believed
because Huish had told them he was so involved, and as such he
had a duty to them.

He did not disclose that he was keeping any

amount as a commission for the extension from that loan.
Further, he did not even procure a loan.
11. Plaintiffs also wrote a check to UTCO on October 3,
2000, at the behest of H^ish, to further reduce the loan to UTCO.
That was applied to reduce the UTCO loan.
12. In November Huish advised that he almost had a long term
replacement loan in place, that it should occur before
Thanksgiving, and that plaintiffs should obtain another loan to
cover the extension fees and interest through November and
possible into December.

The parties stipulated and the court

finds that at that point in time, November, Huish was involved
with a bank in Ogden and was attempting to secure long term
financing for plaintiffs. In the meantime, because the balloon
payment date had now been extended to November 1, 2000, Huish
indicated to plaintiffs they should obtain another loan so
another extension could be obtained.

Huish found another lender,

WaterPro, and arranged a loan to plaintiffs in the amount of
$70,000 for plaintiffs.

That closed November 3, 2000, and Huish

prepared and brought all the closing documents to that closing
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provision as plaintiffs testified. The court credits the
testimony of plaintiffs and accords more weight to it than to the
testimony of Huish, which was contrary to that understanding of
plaintiff.

Huish testified the document

was clear, and he

explained what those funds were for, namely, for the extension
from November 1 to December 1, 2000.

Of that amount given to

Utah Funding, Huish then paid UTCO the sum of $9314 as an
extension fee on November 6, 2000, and kept the remainder. Again,
the court finds Huish had authority to extend the loan payment
date on terms he desired and Huish took advantage of that and
told plaintiffs an incomplete story.

The court finds Huish had a

duty to fully explain what that amount was for and he failed to
do so.
15. When no long term loan was forthcoming, UTCO through
Huish advised that a $50,000 roll over or extension fee would be
needed for December.

The court again finds that, contrary to

Huish' testimony, it was Huish' decision to set that amount as he
had a relationship, ongoing, with UTCO where both UTCO and Huish
could receive income from granting extensions.

Huish became

aware that plaintiffs had exhausted their borrowing ability from
all their other properties, and plaintiffs could not meet that
new extension fee requirement Huish set.

Plaintiffs filed for

Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection December 6, 2000.

They have

since had the Beck street property repossessed, along with
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and had the title company disburse the funds according to his
direction. From that amount Huish received a commission of
$4,900, and $13,977 went to Synergetic for interest on the UTCO
loan.

Synergetic is another business run by the principals of

UTCO.

That was done by Huish, inferentially at the behest of

UTCO. Huish prepared the instructions for disbursement. The sum
of $27,955.98 was listed on the closing document as "To Utah
Funding and Loan, For 30 day Loan extension Beck Street.''
13. The court finds and concludes that document was net an
integrated contract and was ambiguous as to at least what that
term meant.

Accordingly, the court received conditionally, and

now considers, other evidence to determine the intent of the
parties.
14. The court finds Huish explained that amount was set
aside to be held as needed in trust. A valid escrow account or
trust was not created as there was no writing to that effect.
However, the court does find that plaintiffs were told that if
that amount was needed it would be held by Utah Funding to pay
further extension fees or interest, or to pay commissions to
Huish for his work in obtaining the long term financing, then
those funds would be used for that purpose.

If the funds were

not used for those purposes they would be returned to plaintiffs.
The provision is not clear from its language within the document
as Huish asserts and the court finds Huish explained the
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several other properties.
16. Plaintiffs asked for the return of the money that was
given to Utah Funding but Huish refused.
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The disclosure statement is ambiguous and parol evidence
was and is necessary to determine the intent of the parties
concerning the WaterPro loan proceeds.
2. Huish breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by
failing to fully disclose that from the WaterPro loan proceeds he
was taking a commission from those amounts. Huish did not
disclose in any way what he was doing with those proceeds nor
what extension was being sought.

There are no documents other

than the disclosure statement which Huish prepared, which is
ambiguous, and which Huish did not explain except as found by the
court.

Huish said those funds would be held for other purposes

and returned to plaintiffs if not need for those purposes. Huish
benefitted himself at the expense of plaintiffs and his actions
were not consistent with the duty he owed.

Plaintiffs suffered

damage.
3.

Conversion is an act of wilful interference with

property, done without lawful justification, by which the person
11

entitled to property is deprived of its use and possession.
Conversion deals with possession.

Thus, the person claiming

conversion, here plaintiffs, must prove that plaintiff was
entitled to immediate possession of the property at the time of
the alleged conversion.

Conversion must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. The court concludes that when
plaintiffs demanded the return of the WaterPro loan proceeds that
were not used for extensions, Huish and defendants converted
those funds.
4. An escrow agreement must be in writing.

There was not

created an express trust.
5. Fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiffs have not met that burden to prove that Huish committed
fraud.
6. Punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or
general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the defendant
were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others. Willful and wanton misconduct
is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to
do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under
such circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would
know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high
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degree of probability, result in harm to another.
Punitive damages must be awarded in an amount that would be
reasonable and proper as a punishment to the defendant for such
wrongs, and as a wholesome warning to others not to offend in
like manner.

If such punitive damages are given, they should be

awarded with caution.

The court may consider the following

factors, among others:(1) the relative wealth of the defendant;
(2) the nature of the misconduct; (3) the facts and circumstances
surrounding the misconduct; (4) the effect of the misconduct on
the lives of others; (5) the likelihood of any recurrence of the
conduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount
of actual, or general or compensatory, damages.
Here, the court concludes that the overall conduct of Huish
was in reckless disregard of the rights of others and plaintiffs
are entitled to punitive damages. On three occasions Huish kept
a commission and failed to advise plaintiffs he was doing so. No
documents explained that an extension fee was being charged.
Huish had basically carte

blanche

authority to charge what he

wanted for an extension yet he did not advise plaintiffs of the
amount he was keeping as a commission.

While Huish may do

business that way, and perhaps has done so for the past fifteen
years, and there was evidence that those involved in such loans
"go by their own rules," and while such loans are a legitimate
part of commerce and are needed and the risk is high, those in
such a position need to fully reveal what the extension and roll
over fees are for.

It appears as if Huish intends to continue to
13
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believe he acted properly. His attitude and demeanor at trial was
clear to the court-he had done nothing improper, and charging
fees without disclosing such was perfectly legitimate and was the
was business was done. The court concludes Huish should pay
punitive damages in the amounts of the commissions he kept on all
loans except the original UTCO loan.
for finding a loan.

That was a legitimate fee

The other fees may have been "legitimate"

had they been disclosed. The court intends the punitive damage
award to act as an incentive to Huish to reveal fully and
completely in such matters that any extensions or roll over fees
are indeed being charged not only by the lender but by the broker
as well,
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on the claims for
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion in the amount of
$18,643.98 plus statutory interest from December 1, 2000 through
the date of judgment.
8. Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive damages in the amount
of $50,000.

The conduct was ongoing, harmed plaintiffs in a far

greater amount than this damage award reveals, Huish was a
fiduciary for plaintiffs and had a high duty toward them, Huish'
attitude was one of defiance and thus is likely to recur in an
ongoing basis, and while there was no testimony as to the
relative wealth of Huish, he obtained fees from plaintiffs in an
amount over $100,000 for conducing business with UTCO with whom
he had an insider relationship.

The amount is probably very

generous to Huish and could easily be more.

The court finds his

conduct most outrageous.

Plaintiff is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.
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BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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opinions.)

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Robert MIGUEL and Jean Miguel,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Raymond J. BELZESKI, Individually and as
Administrator of the Estate of Raymond
J. Bell, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 94-3389.
Argued Oct. 24, 1995.
Decided Nov. 29, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court, for
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
No. 90 C 6054; Paul E. Plunkett, Judge.
N.D.lll.
AFFIRMED.
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE and ROVNER,
Circuit Judges.
ORDER
**1 The chain of events producing this diversity
litigation [FN1] dates back to 1975 when Robert
Miguel decided to procure a bail bond on behalf of
an arrested relative from bondsman James
Cosentino. [FN2] At that time, Robert Miguel and
his wife Jean Miguel (hereinafter the "Miguels")

were joint owners of a vacant, unimproved lot in
Chicago (hereinafter the "property"). In order to
obtain issuance of the bail bond, it was apparently
agreed that Mr. Miguel would give Cosentino
$5,000 together with quitclaim deeds to the
property. In April, 1975, the Miguels each
executed separate quitclaim deeds in favor of
Raymond Bell as instructed by Cosentino. The
deeds were given to Cosentino and thereafter it
appears that a bail bond was issued by the Imperial
Insurance Company via Bell. Although the bail
bond was never forfeited, the quitclaim deeds were
not returned to the Miguels. Rather, it appears that
the deeds were delivered to Bell and were recorded
in September, 1975. Over the years, the property
has been conveyed down the line of the defendants.
The property has since been developed and as of
June 1993, allegedly had a fair market value of
approximately $620,000.
The original complaint in this case was filed in
October, 1990. The Miguels most recently alleged
in their Fifth Amended Complaint that the deeds
were executed and deposited with Cosentino solely
as collateral for the bail bond and that the deeds
were not to be delivered to Bell except upon
forfeiture of the bail bond. The Miguels further
alleged that by depositing the deeds with Cosentino
they never intended to transfer, deliver or pass title
to Bell. They seek monetary damages against
certain defendants as well as a determination that
title be quieted in favor of plaintiffs and that all
claims and interests of defendants in the property be
canceled and removed.
The district court granted summary judgment
[FN3] on behalf of all defendants, concluding that
the Miguels had not raised a genuine issue with
regard to the ambiguity of the deeds and had failed
to designate specific facts demonstrating a genuine
issue with regard to the existence of a writing
evidencing the escrow agreement that would satisfy
the Illinois Statute of Frauds (hereinafter "Statute").
[FN4] We agree with the district judge's
conclusions, as evidenced in his Memorandum
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Opinion and Order, which is attached Miguel v
Beheski 1993 WL 460847 (N D 111, Nov 5, 1993)
We separately address the Miguels' arguments not
addressed by the district court
On appeal, the Miguels first argue that the district
court erred by failing to credit the deposition
testimony of Mr Miguel as constituting a sworn
statement setting forth the existence and terms of
the agreement between Miguel and Cosentino
sufficient to satisfy the Statute This argument
must fail Defendants point out that the Miguels did
not contend in the district court that the deposition
testimony of Mr Miguel was sufficient to satisfy the
Statute and that this issue has therefore been
waived However, the district court specifically
found that "[n]o affidavit, deposition testimony, or
admission suggests that such a writing exists"
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November
4, 1993, p 15 This finding suggests that the
district court reviewed the record on its own
initiative to determine whether or not summary
judgment was appropriate Although we therefore
find that this issue was not waived, an examination
of the excerpted deposition testimony relied upon
by the Miguels fails to clearly demonstrate the
existence of a writing, its terms, or that it was
signed by either Cosentino or Bell
**2 For their second argument, plaintiffs contend
that the district court erred by failing to recognize
that Cosentino fraudulently breached his fiduciary
duty as escrowee to the Miguels and that the
defendants thereby had the burden of demonstrating
the validity of the transaction Defendants contend
that this argument on appeal was also waived as not
presented to the district court The Miguels'
second argument hinges on the existence of a valid
escrow agreement As the Miguels have run afoul
of the Statute and have thereby failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue as to the existence of
the escrow agreement, we need not address the
second issue or determine whether or not it has been
waived
The judgment below is affirmed
ATTACHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
Robert Miguel and Jean Miguel, Plaintiffs,
v
Raymond J Belzeski, individually and as
Administrator of the Estate of Rayrrond
J Bell, deceased, Mark Richardson Bell, Holly
Mills, Kirk Daniel Bell,
Chicago Title and Trust Company, as Trustee under
Trust No 9529, John J
Lag, First Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trusiee under
Trust 9529, Theodore A
Wynn, Lawrence J Oakford, NBD Trust
Company of Illinois, as Trustee under
Trust 6018, Harris Bank/Glencoe-Northbrook,
N A , and Unknown Owners,
Defendants
No 90 C 6054
Docketed Nov 3, 1993
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PLUNKETT, District Judge
This case is before us on Defendants' motions for
summary
judgment
In
separate
motions,
Defendants NBD Trust Company of Illinois, as
Trustee
("NBD")
and
Harris
Bank
of
Glencoe-Northbrook, N A ("Harris Bank"), and
Defendants Raymond Belzeski, Mark Richardson
Bell, Holly Mills, and Kirk Daniel Bell
(collectively, the "Bell Heirs defendants") are
seeking summary judgment against Plaintiffs Robert
Miguel and Jean Miguel (the "Miguels") of
Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint For the
reasons stated below, we grant both motions and
dismiss Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint as
again st those Defendants [FN 1 ]
Background
As this Court noted in its July 13, 1992,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, (Memorandum
Opinion and Order at 2, Miguel v Belzeski, No 90
C 60M (N D III July 13, 1992) (Plunkett, J )), this
action arises out of a series of events that trace back
to April 1975 It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff
Robert Miguel contacted a bail bondsman named
James Cosentino at American Bonding Company in
early 1975 to obtain a bond for a relative
According to Plaintiff Robert Miguel, at the time he
dealt uith Cosentino he believed Cosentino was "
'the brains of the outfit' " and " 'the head of the
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Mr. Miguel agreed to give Cosentino $5000 and a
quitclaim deed to a piece of property owned by
Plaintiffs (the "Property") in return for issuance of a
$25,000 bond for Mr. Miguel's relative. [FN2]
Plaintiffs executed quitclaim deeds on the Property
in favor of a Raymond Bell on or about April 24,
1975. [FN3] (Defs.' Rule 12(m) Stmt. K 1.) It is
uncontroverted at this point that the deeds were
deposited with James Cosentino and not given
directly to Bell by the Miguels. Imperial Insurance
Company issued the bond through Raymond Bell,
who
had
been
appointed
as
Imperial's
attorney-in-fact for purposes of issuing the bond.
(Pis/ Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ.J., Group Exh.
Al.)
**3 According to Plaintiffs, the deeds were
intended solely as collateral for the bond. [FN4]
(Fifth Am.CompI. at f 14.) They allege that
Cosentino was not to deliver the deeds to Bell
unless the bond was forfeited. (Id) Plaintiffs
maintain that they never intended to transfer title to
Bell or effect a delivery of the deeds to Bell by
depositing the deeds with Cosentino. (Id.)
Plaintiffs have not produced a written agreement or
any writing evidencing the condition allegedly
attached to the transfer of the Property or the
alleged escrow arrangement between Plaintiffs and
Cosentino. The deeds themselves do not refer to
any conditions or the existence of an extrinsic
agreement. (Fifth Am.CompI., Exhs. A & B.)
Plaintiffs allege that there are other documents but
only those recorded in Cook County can be located.
(Pis.'Rule 12(n) Stmt, at H 15.)
The bond was never forfeited. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.'
Mots, for Summ.J., Group Exh. A.) Nonetheless,
the deeds were delivered to Bell at some time prior
to September 1975. Bell recorded the deeds in
September 1975. [FN5]
Raymond Bell died intestate in Indiana in 1981.
(Fifth Am.CompI. at ^ 18.) The Property passed
to Defendants Bell Heirs. They conveyed the
Property in 1989 to Defendant Chicago Title &
Trust Company, as Trustee ("CT & T"), (Fifth
Am.CompI. at f 19), who then conveyed it to

Defendant First Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee
("First Illinois"). (Id at % 20.) First Illinois
conveyed the Property to Defendant NBD as
Trustee in February 1990. (Fifth Am.CompI. at %
21; Defs.' Mem.Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Aff. of
Michael A. Bentcover at 1 3.) In March 1990,
Defendant NBD borrowed money from Defendant
Harris Bank to develop the property and granted
Defendant Harris Bank a mortgage interest in the
Property. [FN6] (Fifth Am.CompI. at fl 22.)
Plaintiffs apparently continued to be billed by
Cook County until 1989 for the real estate taxes due
on the Property. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for
Summ. J., Group Exh. B.) According to receipts
and real estate tax bills submitted by Plaintiffs in
response to Defendants' NBD and Harris Bank
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs paid real
estate taxes on the Property for the years 1974- 75,
and 1978-1989. [FN7] (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that
they did not become aware of the fact that Bell had
obtained the deeds and recorded them until late
1980 or early 1990. (Fifth Am.CompI. at % 28.)
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in October
1990. That complaint sought to quiet title and
named CT & T, Harris Bank, and NBD as
defendants. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended
Complaint on November 12, 1991, naming Mark
Bell, Holly Mills, Raymond Belzeski, and Kirk Bell
as Defendants. In that complaint, Plaintiffs sought
to recover damages for the sale of the property
rather than to quiet title.
The Defendants in the Second Amended Complaint
sought summary judgment on four grounds: (1) the
fact that the quitclaim deeds were unconditional on
their face rendered the conveyance to Raymond
Bell absolute at law; (2) no fraud claim existed
against Raymond Bell because Plaintiffs dealt
exclusively with Cosentino and hence Plaintiffs had
no derivative claim against Raymond Bell's heirs;
(3) any claim that Plaintiffs might have had was
extinguished by the Indiana nonclaim statute; and
(4) Plaintiffs' claim was barred by the Illinois statute
of limitations. The Court denied the motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the
validity of the delivery of the deed was a material
issue of fact; and (2) the Plaintiffs' due diligence in
discovering the fraud was a material issue of fact in
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determining whether or not the running of the
Illinois statute of limitations was tolled.
**4 Plaintiffs filed a Fifth Amended Complaint in
April of 1993. The Fifth Amended Complaint
named as Defendants Raymond J. Belzeski, Mark
Richardson Bell, Holly Mills, Kirk Daniel Bell
(collectively, the "Bell Heirs"), Chicago Title &
Trust Company, as Trustee, John J. Lag, [FN8] First
Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee, Theodore A.
Wynn, [FN9] Lawrence J. Oakford, [FN 10] NBD
Trust
Company
of
Illinois,
Harris
Bank/Glencoe-Northbrook, N.A., and unknown
owners. Count I of the Fifth Amended Complaint
seeks damages of $75,000 against Defendants Bell
Heirs. Count II apparently seeks to quiet title as
against all titleholders in the chain of title
subsequent to the Bell Heirs. [FN11]
Defendants NBD and Harris Bank filed a motion
for summary judgment as to Count II of the Fifth
Amended Complaint on July 30, 1993. They move
for summary judgment on four grounds: (1)
Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the Illinois Statute of
Frauds; (2) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by laches; (3)
Plaintiffs passed good title to Raymond Bell
because the deeds are absolute as a matter of law;
and (4) Defendants NBD and Harris Bank are
protected as a matter of law as bona fide purchasers.
Defendants Bell Heirs filed a motion for summary
judgment as to Count I of the Fifth Amended
Complaint on July 23, 1993. They, like
Defendants NBD and Harris Bank, move for
summary judgment on statute of frauds and good
title grounds. They also seek summary judgment
on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs' claim is barred by
the nonclaim statute of the Indiana Probate Code;
and (2) Count I is barred by the five-year Illinois
Statute of Limitations.
Analysis
For Defendants to prevail on a motion for summary
judgment, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with affidavits, if any [must] show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmovant bears
the burden of proof on a dispositive issue, "the

nonmoving party [is required] to go beyond the
pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the
'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 417 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The issue is "whether a
proper jury question is presented." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
If a condition to the effectiveness of a deed does
not appear on the face of such deed, the deed
becomes absolute at law when delivered unless
delivery is made in escrow to a third person. Loque
v. yon Almen, 40 N.E.2d 73, 77 (111.1941). Under
Illinois law, an escrow is established "when a deed
is deposited by a grantor with a third person and
that person is to deliver the deed to the grantee only
upon the fulfillment of some condition." LaSalle
Nat'l Bank v. Kissane, 516 N.E.2d 790, 792
(III.App.Ct.1987).
**5 When the conveyance is contingent on the
occurrence of some event, title is not conveyed
when the deed is delivered into escrow. Fairbwy
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Bank of 111, 462 N.E.2d
6, 9 (III.App.1984). Furthermore, no title is
conveyed if there is an unauthorized delivery of the
deed by the escrow agent to the grantee. Id. In
other words, title does not pass to the grantee if the
escrow agent delivers the deed to the grantee prior
to the occurrence of the designated condition.
The parties here agree that the Migueis did not
deliver the deeds directly to Bell, the grantee. The
Migueis delivered them to Cosentino. As a result,
"the general presumption in favor of unconditional
delivery does not apply." (Mem.Op. and Order at 7,
Miguel v. Belzeski, No. 90 C 6054 (N.D.II1 July 13,
1993) (Plunkett, J.).) Thus, as we noted in our July
13, 1993 order, the validity of the conveyance to
Bell turns on the issue of whether there was proper
delivery of the deeds. {Id. at 10.) That issue in
turn depends on whether or not an escrow was
established when the Migueis delivered the deeds to
Cosentino.
According to the Migueis, Cosentino was not to
deliver the deeds to Bell unless the bond issued
through Bell's efforts was forfeited. They claim
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that title did not transfer to Bell because the deed
was delivered to Bell even though the required
event-the forfeiture of the bond-never occurred.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of the validity of the
conveyance to Bell on several grounds. They
argue first that Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the
Illinois Statute of Frauds, 740 ILCS 80/2. They
argue alternatively that no valid escrow
arrangement exists because Cosentino does not
qualify under Illinois law as a third-party escrowee.
Finally, they argue that the conveyance was valid
because the deeds themselves are unambiguous and
unconditional and are absolute as a matter of law in
the absence of a valid escrow arrangement.
In order to defeat this portion of Defendants'
motions for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue either with
regard to the existence of an escrow or with regard
to the ambiguous nature of the deeds themselves.
With regard to the alleged escrow arrangement,
Plaintiffs must show that there is a genuine issue (1)
that the deed was delivered to an person who could
qualify as a third-party escrowee under Illinois law;
and (2) that delivery of the deed was subject to an
extrinsic condition. Because Plaintiffs bear the
burden of proof with regard to these issues,
Plaintiffs may not rest on the pleadings but must by
"affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate
'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.' " Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. at 324
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
In response to Defendants' motions, Plaintiffs argue
that the deeds are ambiguous as a result of certain
tax exemption stamps that were affixed on them.
According to Plaintiffs
**6 [t]he ambiguity is two-fold. First, although
the deeds are for the same property, it is unclear
whether the same exemption sections were
applicable to each deed. Second, if paragraph c
applies, then the deeds were not unconditional on
their face because they were stated to "secure
debt or other obligation."
Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.
Plaintiffs maintain, without citation to any statute or
caselaw to support their argument, that the

referenced sections of the Illinois Real Estate
Transfer Tax Act and the Chicago Transaction
Code are "incorporated into and must be interpreted
as part of the plain language of the deeds as
recorded." Id.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there is a
genuine issue of fact with regard to the nature of the
deeds themselves. Three of the four stamps are
legible, and reference exemptions based on the
amount of consideration. One of the deeds, the one
executed by Mr. Miguel, is stamped with consistent
stamps. Plaintiffs have not offered any explanation
as to why Bell might have referenced two different
exemptions on the other deed when it conveyed the
same piece of property.
Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Rule
56(e) with respect to the nature of the deeds. They
did not produce evidence beyond their own
allegations to support their contention that the deeds
are ambiguous. As a result, they must demonstrate
a genuine issue with regard to the existence of an
escrow arrangement to withstand Defendants'
motions for summary judgment on the issue of valid
delivery.
Assuming that Cosentino qualifies as a valid
third-party escrowee under Illinois law, [FN 12]
Plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of a valid
escrow arrangement in order to prevail at trial. The
question raised by Defendants' motions is whether
they must do so by producing some writing
memorializing the arrangement.
Defendants maintain that, because Plaintiffs' claim
revolves around the conveyance of land, any
extrinsic condition or agreement must be in writing
to be enforceable by Plaintiffs. According to
Defendants, in the absence of a writing evidencing
the alleged escrow arrangement between the
Miguels and Cosentino the Court must look to the
deeds alone.
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, Illinois law requires
that the escrow arrangement be evidenced by a
writing. The Illinois statute of frauds provides that
an action for the sale of land cannot be maintained
unless the contract or some memorandum or note
thereof is in writing, signed by the party to be
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charged. 740 ILCS 80/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, this
requirement applies to escrow arrangements such as
the one here.
In order that an instrument may operate as an
escrow when delivered to one not a party to the
instrument, to be delivered in turn, to a party to
the instrument upon the performance of certain
conditions, there must be a valid contract between
the parties as to the subject-matter [sic] of the
instrument.... [T]o meet the requirements of
section 2 of the statute of frauds, no form of
language is necessary, if only the intention can be
gathered, and that any kind of writing, from a
solemn deed down to mere hasty notes or
memoranda in books, papers, or letters will
suffice, but the writings, notes, or memoranda
must contain on their face, or by reference to
others, the names of the parties, vendor and
vendee, a sufficiently clear and explicit
description of the property to render it capable of
being identified from other property of like kind,
together with the terms, conditions (if any), and
price to be paid or other consideration to be
given, and such writing must be signed by the
party to be charged....
**7 Johnson v. Walden, 173 N.E. 790, 792
(111.1930).
Proof of an oral agreement conditioning the
delivery of title and establishing an escrow
arrangement is not enough. See, e.g., Hubbard v.
Schumaker, 402 N.E.2d 857 (llI.App.1980). In
Hubbard, Plaintiff sought to impose a constructive
trust on an interest in property that she had
conveyed to her brother. She maintained that "she
signed over her one-quarter interest to her brother
so he could borrow money." Hubbard v.
Schumaker, 402 N.E.2d at 859. She further alleged
that he had orally promised to " 'make it right' for
her." Id. at 859-860. The court held that any oral
agreement to reconvey the property "would have
been void under the Statute of Frauds." Id. at 861.
The situation here is analogous in all material
respects. The deeds executed in favor of Bell do
not indicate the existence of a condition. The
deeds were delivered to the grantee. The
conveyance of title allegedly was conditioned on
the occurrence of a certain event, here, the

forfeiture of the bond. Thus, according to the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard,
Plaintiffs can only prevail on their claim if they are
able to prove the existence of some writing
evidencing the alleged escrow arrangement with
Cosentino and Bell. Even if Plaintiffs were able to
prove the existence of an oral agreement, that would
not be enough under the Statute of Frauds.
There are reasons for the Statute of Frauds
requirement. Without such a rule governing
conveyances of land, parties to such transactions
could attempt to unravel them many years later by
alleging the existence of an oral agreement
contradicting the absolute language of the deed
itself. The trier of fact would have absolutely no
way of ascertaining the substance of the agreement.
The problem is well-illusirated here. The alleged
oral agreement between the Miguels and
Cosentino/Bell was entered into over eighteen years
ago. Bell is long dead and Cosentino cannot be
found. The deed may have been delivered solely to
secure the bond-in which case it should have been
returned to the Miguels when the bond was not
forfeited-or it may have been delivered as part of
the premium for the bond-in which case Bell was
entitled to the property and rightfully recorded the
deed. Without some sort of writing evidencing the
agreement, there is simply no way for the Court or
the trier of fact to know the truth.
The operative condition need not appear on the
face of the deed to create a valid escrow. Because
such a condition concerns the delivery of the deed,
not the efficacy of the deed itself, it is immaterial
whether the condition appears on the face of the
deed or is contained in an extrinsic agreement.
Tiffany, Real Property § 1048 (3d ed. 1975).
Delivery to a third party creates an exception to the
parol evidence rule. Ballantine, "Delivery in
Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule," 29 Yale L.J
826, 827 (1920). Thus, Plaintiffs may prove the
existence of the condition, and hence, the existence
of an escrow arrangement, by extrinsic evidence.
**8 Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have not introduced the
evidence necessary to defeat Defendants' motions
for summary judgment. No writing of any sort
evidencing the alleged escrow agreement has been
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produced in response to Defendants' motions The
deeds themselves cannot serve as the writing
because they do not reference the condition No
affidavit, deposition testimony, or admission
suggests that such writing exists [FN 13]
Conclusion
Plaintiffs have not introduced the evidence
necessary to demonstrate that there is an issue that
must go to a jury They have not raised a genuine
issue with regard to the ambiguity of the deeds
Taken by themselves, the deeds appear absolute at
law and do not support Plaintiffs' claim that the
conveyance to Bell was invalid Plaintiffs' claim
thus depends on the existence of a written extrinsic
agreement conditioning the delivery of the deed to
Bell While the uncontroverted evidence regarding
the delivery to Cosentino does raise an issue
regarding the existence of an escrow agreement,
Plaintiffs have failed to designate specific facts that
show that there is a genuine issue with regard to the
existence of a writing evidencing that agreement
Plaintiffs' claim cannot stand
Plaintiffs will no doubt feel that this result is harsh
Nonetheless, the Court is not free to disregard
Illinois law, and under Illinois law an escrow
agreement such as the one alleged here must be in
writing to be enforceable As Plaintiffs have
produced no evidence that suggests that such a
writing exists, Defendants' motions for summary
judgment are hereby granted [FN 14]
DATED November 4, 1993
FN1 The district court's jurisdiction was
conferred by 28 U S C § 1332(a)(1)
FN2 Additional background information
is set forth in prior proceedings in this case
reported at Miguel v Belzeski, 797 F Supp
636 (NDII1, 1992) as well as m the
district court's Memorandum Opinion and
Order
granting
summary
judgment
Miguel v Belzeski, 1993 WL 460847
FN3 The district court's Memorandum
Opinion and Order dated November 4,
1993 and docketed November 5, 1993
granted summary judgment to some but

not all defendants Additional defendants
were granted summary judgment on
December 3, 1993 for the same reasons as
those stated in the district courts
November 4, 1993 opinion, and a Rule 58
Judgment was docketed on December 8,
1993 A Rule 59(e) Motion filed by the
Miguels was stricken as untimely on
January 19, 1994 and a notice of appeal
was filed on February 17, 1994 (No
94-1422) Upon subsequent consideration
of jurisdictional memoranda filed by the
parties and a motion to dismiss for lack of
appellate jurisdiction, this court dismissed
the Miguels' appeal as premature, it
appearing that the district court's judgment
did not dispose of the Miguels' claims
against all defendants
In subsequent
proceedings, the district court granted a
motion to amend the December 8, 1993
judgment to include Chicago Title and
Trust, and a Rule 58 Judgment was
docketed on September 9, 1994 The
Miguels' Motion to Reconsider was denied
by the district court on October 5, 1994,
and a notice of appeal was filed on
October 11, 1994 Appellate jurisdiction
is conferred by 29 U S C § 1291
FN4 740 ILCS 80/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
FN1 The Court does not, by this order
dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint as ro
the remaining Defendants, namely, First
Illinois Bank and Trust, as Trustee,
Theodore A Wynn and Lawrence J
Oakford, as beneficial owners of the First
Illinois Trust, and unknown owners
FN2 The Property is located in Cook
County, Illinois (Defs' Rule 12(m) Stmt H
3 ) at 1512 West Diversey Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois (Pis' First Rule 12(n)
Stmt U 3 ) At the time the deed was
delivered to Cosentino, the Property was
an unimproved vacant lot
FN3 Because the Property was held
jointly by Mr and Mrs Miguel, they each
executed a quitclaim deed to the Property

© 2005 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works

Page 8

70 F.3d 1274 (Table)
70 F.3d 1274 (Table), 1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir.flll.))
Unpublished Disposition
(Cite as: 70 F.3d 1274,1995 WL 704769 (7th Cir.(IiL)))
FN4. Plaintiffs do not offer an explanation
of why the deeds were executed in favor of
Bell rather than Cosentino when it was
Cosentino who they approached for the
bond.
FN5. As noted in the Court's July 13, 1992
Order each of the recorded deeds have two
exemption stamps signed by Raymond Bell
on them, one indicating an exemption from
state tax and one indicating an exemption
from city tax (Mem.Op. and Order at 2-3
& n. 4, Miguel v. Belzeski, No. 90 C 6054
(N.D.I11. July 13, 1992) (Plunkett, J.).)
FN6. Defendant NBD alleges that it has
developed the Property extensively since
acquiring it in 1990. (Bentcover Affidavit
at % 7.) According to NBD, the Property
was acquired by NBD in 1990 for
approximately $97,500. (Id at fl 4.)
NBD alleges that the Property currently
has a fair market value of approximately
$620,000. (Id at J 7.)
FN7. According to those records, taxes for
the periods of 1974-75 and 1978-84 were
not paid by Plaintiffs when due, but were
redeemed by Plaintiffs in January and
February 1989. (Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mots,
for Summ. J., Group Exh. B.) Plaintiffs
allege that they also paid the real estate
taxes on the Property for 1976-1977. The
Court is unable to confirm that fact from
the records submitted by Plaintiffs.
FN8. Lag is named as the beneficial owner
of Trust 1092665 held by Defendant CT &
T.
FN9. Wynn is named as beneficial owner
of Trust 9529 held by Trustee First Illinois
Bank and Trust.
FN 10. Oakford is named as beneficial
owner of Trust 9529 held by Trustee First
Illinois Bank and Trust.
FN 11. The complaint does not specify
clearly the relief sought by Plaintiffs, but

states that
25. Defendants unlawfully claim and have
claimed title to said property by virtue of
subsequent deeds and instruments executed
and delivered at said times set forth above.
26. The claims of defendants are invalid
for the reasons that said deeds and trusts
were based on ineffective instruments as
said property was never legally delivered
nor transferred to Raymond J. Bell; and
thus, all subsequent transfers are of no
effect.
28. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at
law as the subject matter of this action is
unique real estate.
(Fifth Am.CompI. at ffi 25, 26, 28.)
FN 12. Defendants argue that Cosentino
does not qualify as a third party escrowee
under Illinois law. Because we conclude
that the Statute of Frauds bars Plaintiffs'
claim
regardless
of
Cosentino's
qualifications as an escrowee, we need not
reach that issue.
FN 13. Plaintiffs' Local Rule 12(n)
statement contains a vague allegation that
"[t]here were other documents executed by
the Miguels regarding the transaction that
is the subject of the Complaint; however,
only copies of documents recorded in
Cook County can be located." (Pis.* First
Rule 12(n) Stmt, at K 15.) The statement
does not specify the identify of the "other
documents." It does not describe their
contents. It does not indicate that the
documents were signed by either
Cosentino or Bell. Even if such a
statement could be considered under Rule
56(e), it would be inadequate to raise a
genuine issue of fact.
We note that it would not have been
difficult for Plaintiffs to overcome the
Statute of Frauds problem if in fact the
necessary writing had existed. If the facts
are as alleged (i.e., that the writing existed
but had been lost), Plaintiffs could have
submitted a sworn statement attesting to
the fact that Bell had signed an agreement
that provided that the deeds were only to
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be delivered if the bond were forfeited, but
that the agreement was lost. While we
express no judgment as to whether such
evidence would have carried the day in
front of a jury, it certainly would have
been sufficient to show that there was a
genuine issue for trial.
FN 14. Because the Court concludes that
Defendants' are entitled to summary
judgment on Statute of Frauds grounds, the
Court does not reach the issue of whether
Plaintiffs' claim is barred by laches, the
Illinois statute of limitations, or the
nonclaim statute of the Indiana Probate
Code, or the issue of whether Defendants
NBD and Harris Bank are protected as
bona fide purchasers.
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